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INTRODUCTION 
Forgiven or cancelled loan debt is an accession to wealth,1 and 
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therefore constitutes taxable income under the Internal Revenue Code.2 
However, for the period of January 1, 2007, through December 31, 
2012,3 Congress has enacted legislation in the Mortgage Forgiveness 
 
their skilled editorial review and assistance.  
1 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel Simmons, A Field Guide to Cancellation of 
Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW 415, 417 (2010) (“If the loan transaction is viewed as a whole, 
when a borrower receives money in a loan transaction and is later discharged from the 
liability without repaying the debt, the borrower has realized an accession to wealth. 
Recognizing the existence of income in this situation generally is not a problem for the 
income tax system. The receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not income because the receipt is 
offset by an obligation to repay the borrowed amount. If the obligation to repay the 
borrowed amount is eliminated or reduced without the concomitant repayment, the borrower 
realizes an accession to wealth that, as a matter of tax theory, should be included in gross 
income.”); See also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3, 5 (1931) (A 
corporation sold its own bonds in 1923 for $12,126,800, equal to their par value. Later that 
same year, the corporation repurchased the bonds below par, at a discount of approximately 
$137,521. The court ruled that “. . . the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a result of its 
dealings it made available $ 137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds 
now extinct. We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions. The 
defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income . . ..”); See also James 
L. Musselman, Is Income from Discharge of Indebtedness Really Income at All? A Proposal 
for a More Reasoned Analysis, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 607, 633-634 (2004) (“When 
determining the value received from the discharge of indebtedness, it is necessary to 
evaluate the transaction that initially created the indebtedness since any value the taxpayer 
received from a discharge of indebtedness would have been received at that time. Notably, 
the value received by the taxpayer at the time of the transaction initially creating the 
indebtedness would not have been included in the taxpayer’s gross income at that time 
because the receipt of such value coincided with the creation of the indebtedness by the 
taxpayer, thus resulting in no accession to the taxpayer’s wealth.  In most cases, 
determination of the value received by the taxpayer in a transaction creating an indebtedness 
is simple. If a taxpayer borrows $ 10,000 from a bank in cash, and the debt is subsequently 
discharged by the bank, the taxpayer would clearly have $ 10,000 of gross income from 
discharge of indebtedness. No one would argue with the conclusion that the taxpayer 
received $ 10,000 of value when he borrowed that amount from the bank because he 
received $ 10,000 in cash.”)  See generally Jay A. Nathanson, Tax Issues in Workouts and 
Foreclosures, 65 J. MO. B. 240, 240-241 (2009) (explaining that unless otherwise expressly 
excluded, income from cancellation or discharge of indebtedness is generally to be included 
in gross income as an accession to wealth). 
2 See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2010) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever 
source derived, including (but not limited to) . . . (12) Income from discharge of 
indebtedness . . . .”); See also Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income and 
Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 313-315 (2009) (explaining that there is a 
philosophical distinction between a forgiven loan where the taxpayer receives an actual 
economic gain versus a “no benefit debt” such as a forgiven tort judgment where the tort 
debtor never benefitted from a tangible economic benefit by incurring the original tort debt). 
3 The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 initially allowed the tax free 
discharge of debt from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2009. See H.R. Res. 3648, 
110th Cong. §§ 2(a), 2(d) (2007) (enacted). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 extended the deadline from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2012. See H.R. Res. 
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Debt Relief Act of 20074 (hereinafter “MoFoDRA”) which exempts 
forgiven loan debt on a principal residence5 from taxation. From 2007 
through 2012, MoFoDRA allows individuals to completely escape 
taxation on unpaid loan debt used to speculate on residential real estate.6 
 
1424, 110th Cong. § 303 (2008) (enacted).  See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2010). 
4  H.R. Res. 3648, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted); See also 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) 
(“Gross income does not include any amount which . . . would be includible in gross income 
by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if . . . the 
indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness which is discharged 
before January 1, 2013.”). 
5 Vacation homes and rental properties are excluded from coverage. See 26 U.S.C. § 
108(h)(5) (2010) (“(5) Principal residence. For purposes of this subsection, the term 
“principal residence” has the same meaning as when used in section 121.”). The 
legislation’s reference to section 121 (26 U.S.C. § 121) is a bit misleading because section 
121 nowhere defines “principal residence.” Instead, one must look to the Internal Revenue 
Service regulations for guidance. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.121-1(b)(1) (2010) (“Whether property 
is used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer’s residence depends upon all the facts and 
circumstances.”); See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (2010) (“In the case of a taxpayer 
using more than one property as a residence, whether property is used by the taxpayer as the 
taxpayer’s principal residence depends upon all the facts and circumstances. If a taxpayer 
alternates between 2 properties, using each as a residence for successive periods of time, the 
property that the taxpayer uses a majority of the time during the year ordinarily will be 
considered the taxpayer’s principal residence. In addition to the taxpayer’s use of the 
property, relevant factors in determining a taxpayer’s principal residence, include, but are 
not limited to (i) The taxpayer’s place of employment; (ii) The principal place of abode of 
the taxpayer’s family members; (iii) The address listed on the taxpayer’s federal and state 
tax returns, driver’s license, automobile registration, and voter registration card; (iv) The 
taxpayer’s mailing address for bills and correspondence; (v) The location of the taxpayer’s 
banks; and (vi) The location of religious organizations and recreational clubs with which the 
taxpayer is affiliated.”). 
6 See 26 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2) (2010) (placing a cap of $2,000,000 of loan forgiveness for 
married couples filing a joint return, and $1,000,000 for all others); See also 26 U.S.C. § 
163(h)(3)(B)(i) (2010) (defining acquisition indebtedness (referenced in 26 U.S.C. § 
108(h)(2)) as any indebtedness “incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially 
improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer” and “secured by such residence.”); 
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 467-68 (“[The tax exclusion] does not apply to (1) 
indebtedness on a home that is not the taxpayer’s principal residence, or (2) home equity 
indebtedness. Furthermore, the provision applies only if the debt cancellation was on 
account of either (1) a decline in the value of the home, or (2) the taxpayer’s financial 
condition. The taxpayer’s basis in the residence must be reduced by the excluded amount. 
This basis reduction will not result in any subsequent income recognition as long as the 
taxpayer does not dispose of the residence; and even if the taxpayer does sell the residence, 
the taxpayer could exclude all or part of the realized gain under section 121.”); Charles J, 
Russo, Jeffrey W. Mitchell Jr. & Seth Hammer, Tax Clinic, TAX ADVISER, Aug. 1, 2009, at 
517 (“DOI [discharge of indebtedness] income includes discharge of an individual’s home 
mortgage indebtedness. However, DOI income of a qualified principal residence is excluded 
from gross income for debt discharges from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2012 (Sec. 
108(a)(1)(E)). The exclusion applies whether the taxpayer restructures the debt on the 
principal residence or the debt is reduced because of foreclosure and sale (IR-2008-17). The 
Anderson Formatted.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/2011  3:33 PM 
4 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 36:1 
This tax-free income, in the form of unpaid loan debt, can arise through 
a foreclosure,7 through what is commonly known in real estate parlance 
as a “short sale,”8 or through a significant loan modification.9 
 
exclusion is claimed on Form 982, Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of 
Indebtedness (and Section 1082 Basis Adjustment).  The exclusion applies only to qualified 
principal residence indebtedness, which is the same as acquisition indebtedness as defined 
for purposes of the home mortgage interest deduction. Acquisition indebtedness generally 
includes debt for acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving a principal residence.”).  
7 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 439 (“When a recourse debt secured by a 
lien is reduced to judgment in a foreclosure suit, the amount realized on a subsequent sale of 
the property is the actual sales price. Any deficiency resulting from a sales price less than 
the judgment is a continuing obligation of the debtor, the discharge from which for less than 
full payment will give rise to cancellation of debt income.”); But cf. SHARON KREIDER & 
KAREN BROSI, 2010 REAL ESTATE & INVESTMENT TAX UPDATE, 3-30 (Western CPE 2010) 
(explaining that if the mortgage is nonrecourse, meaning that the lender has agreed that 
taking ownership of the property is its sole remedy, then no cancellation of debt income 
arises from the lender’s foreclosure, even if the amount received upon foreclosure sale is 
less than the mortgage debt owed); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 440 (“If the debt 
is nonrecourse, then the full amount of the debt is treated as the amount realized on the 
transfer of the property, regardless of the value of the property, and no cancellation of debt 
income is realized.”). 
8  See Gregg A. Nathanson, Real Property Law: What’s New in Residential 
Transactions?, 86 MICH. B. J. 16, 18 (2007) (“A ‘short sale’ occurs when a mortgage lender 
agrees to accept less than the total amount owed and releases the borrower from the 
remaining unpaid indebtedness.”); See also KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-36 (“One 
phenomenon in a declining residential mortgage market is dubbed a ‘short pay’ or a ‘short 
sale,’ that is, the home is sold for less than (‘short of’) what is owed on the mortgage.  
Property advertisements sometimes refer to it as a ‘pre-foreclosure’ sale. While the home is 
marketed by the mortgage holder in foreclosure, it is marketed by the homeowner in a short 
sale, generally with the disclosure ‘subject to lender approval.’  . . . In a short sale 
transaction, the lender, not the property owner, makes the ultimate decision to sell.  For the 
property owner, a short sale is sometimes better for their [sic] credit rating then [sic] going 
through foreclosure proceedings. For the lender, the short sale alternative cuts their [sic] 
losses faster than the protracted foreclosure process.”); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 
1, at 467-68 (“A short sale normally involves the sale of the property at or near market price 
with the lender forgiving debt in excess of the sales price.”). 
9 See Russo, Mitchell & Hammer, supra note 6, at 517 (“Under the general rule, a 
modification is significant if, based on all the facts and circumstances, the legal rights or 
obligations that are altered and the degree to which they are altered are economically 
significant (Regs. Sec. 1.1001-3(e)(1)). Under Regs. Sec. 1.1001-3(e), there are four specific 
categories that are considered to be significant modifications to a debt instrument: Changes 
in yield; Changes in the timing of payments; Changes in obligor or security; and Changes in 
the nature of the debt instrument.”); See also 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(10) (2010); Michaels v. 
Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1412, 1414-1416 (1986) (holding that lender’s discount for prepayment of 
home mortgage gives rise to cancellation of debt income); 26 C.F.R.§ 1.1001-3(b); John E. 
Capps, In the Wake of Cottage Savings: The Tax Consequences of Debt Modifications, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2018 (1994) (changes in yield, maturity, obligor, or collateral are 
relevant in considering a modification of debt); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 428 
(“Any reduction in the principal amount of a debt results in realization of cancellation of 
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MoFoDRA is part of a continuing saga of ill-conceived preferential 
tax treatment for residential real estate that includes the 1997 legislation 
that fueled housing speculation by granting up to half a million dollars 
of tax free income, every two years, for profit arising from the sale of a 
primary residence.10 When losses instead of profits became the issue, 
Congress enacted MoFoDRA to grant up to two million dollars of tax 
free income from unpaid mortgage debt. In this Article, I assert that 
MoFoDRA raises continuing concerns regarding ethics, equality, and 
equity in tax and public policy. 
Perhaps guided by lobbyist dollars rather than policy-making logic, 
Congress has failed to assemble coherent tax legislation related to 
residential housing. MoFoDRA does not selectively limit its rewards to 
those with low to moderate incomes who remain in their home and 
continue paying a reduced mortgage obligation. Instead, MoFoDRA 
rewards those who walk away from mortgage debt on a huge scale. 
MoFoDRA allows up to two million dollars of tax-free income, and is 
regressive by rewarding persons who aggressively speculated and stood 
to reap the greatest benefit had they turned a profit. MoFoDRA violates 
vertical equity due to its regressive impact, and violates horizontal 
equity by virtue of its disparate treatment of similarly situated persons 
by providing tax-free income for a random six year time period (2007 
through 2012, inclusive).  MoFoDRA discriminates against all other 
persons who were taxed in the past, and who will be taxed in the future 
for forgiven mortgage debt. 
MoFoDRA’s tax-free treatment of discharged loan income 
represents yet another zenith of imprudence in tax policy by creating a 
reward and incentive for solvent individuals to be unaccountable for 
residential real estate speculation. Congress’s singling out of a tax 
preference for residential real estate speculators who walk away from 
mortgage loan debt from 2007 through 2012 is unfair, unwise, and 
creates a downward influence on residential real estate prices,11 thereby 
 
debt income, regardless of whether a new debt instrument has been substituted or the 
creditor simply agrees to accept a lesser amount in satisfaction of the debt.”). 
10 See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2010); See also Chang Cho, Business Property Sales Under 
Secs. 1031 and 121, TAX ADVISER, Apr. 1, 2000, at 223-24 (“Under Sec. 121(b)(2), for the 
sale of a principal residence on or after May 7, 1997, married couples filing jointly may 
exclude up to $500,000 of gain ($250,000 for singles) . . . .“). 
11  See Peter Salsich, National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 11, 24 
(2011) (“Massive foreclosures of mortgages on both single-family and multi-family 
residences in turn threaten many neighborhoods, particularly those with high concentrations 
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punishing those who pay their debts and remain in their homes. 
In the name of consistency, equality, and equity, I offer three 
solutions to the tax exemption problem under MoFoDRA and any future 
progeny. The first solution is that all discharged debt should be taxed as 
income, and MoFoDRA’s tax exemption should be immediately 
revoked.  The second solution is that all discharged debt, mortgage or 
otherwise, should not be taxed, and reparations should be paid to those 
who were taxed in the past for this income.  The third and perhaps most 
pragmatic solution is that MoFoDRA should be amended to protect 
lower and middle-income individuals who remain in their homes and 
continue to pay their revised loan obligations. 
Popular media coverage of those facing foreclosure tugs at the 
heart strings.12 It is understandable to feel sympathy for those 
individuals who have been innocently taken hostage by tough economic 
times, and to feel empathy for those who exercised poor judgment by 
counting on low interest rates and compounded growth in residential 
real estate thereby causing such individuals to be overextended on a 
mortgage. 
Members of Congress have vehemently argued that MoFoDRA 
was necessary to help such individuals.13 However, even prior to 
 
of low-income and/or minority households.”); See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara 
Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-6 (2011) (“Foreclosures increase 
housing supply and push down housing prices, affecting neighboring homeowners’ property 
values and eroding property tax bases. This effect, in turn, hurts neighbors who have to bear 
either higher taxes or reduced services.”). 
12 See John L. Smith, Desperate Homeowners Find Little Help In Foreclosure Battles, 
LAS VEGAS REV., Sept. 21, 2012, at 1B; Mike Tharp, Discussion Of Trying Times; Residents 
Share Common Experiences Of Losing Homes, Worries About The Future, THE MERCED 
SUN-STAR (CA), Mar. 8, 2010, at A1; Gregg Zoroya, Military Foreclosure Rate Up 32% 
Over 2008; 20,000 Servicemembers, Veterans Lost Their Homes, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2011, 
at 1A; See also Julie Schmit, In Housing Bust, A ‘New Normal,’ USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2011, 
at 1 (housing decline has resulted in massive numbers of “underwater mortgages” with 
homeowners strapped to make ends meet); Julie Lynem, A Dream Foreclosed, TRIBUNE 
(SAN LUIS OBISPO), Feb. 13, 2011, at 1 (loan modifications are difficult to obtain, resulting 
in ongoing increase in foreclosures); Marlize Van Romburgh, Foreclosure Fiasco’s Ground 
Zero, PAC. COAST BUS. TIMES, Oct. 22-28, 2010, at 1 (explaining that statewide in 
California, one in every 178 housing units received a foreclosure filing in September 2010, 
and a temporary moratorium on foreclosures simply delays a continued sink in residential 
housing values). 
13 See 153 CONG. REC. H11, 256 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Cardoza) 
(“I have seen the joy in families’ eyes when they have been able to purchase their first home 
and achieve the American Dream. I have seen the tears when they struggle to make their 
payments and their dream is taken away . . . .  The way I see it, if you are unfortunate 
enough to lose your home to foreclosure because you are struggling, you have suffered 
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MoFoDRA, there already was, and is, a safety valve under the tax code 
in the form of an exemption from taxation on any forgiven debt. This 
insolvency exemption does not require the filing of bankruptcy, and it is 
applied if the borrower meets the qualifications for being deemed as 
insolvent.14 MoFoDRA goes beyond the built-in safety valve of the 
Internal Revenue Code, and it gives solvent real estate speculators a tax 
exempt status, offering a reward and shield to persons who engage in 
strategic defaults and walk away from a home without actually being 
insolvent. 
Part 1 of this Article examines the discharge of indebtedness as a 
form of income that should be taxed. Part 2 evaluates the so-called 
“mortgage meltdown” and the resultant legislation providing a windfall 
to those who benefit from non-payment of mortgage debt. Part 3 
analyzes the public policy and ethical issues associated with the tax-free 
windfall under MoFoDRA. Part 4 proposes practical and equitable 
solutions to the disparate treatment and inequities from the tax 
exemption contained in MoFoDRA. 
 
enough. You shouldn’t be punished further by being taxed on what you no longer own.”); 
153 CONG. REC. S15, 985 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Sen. Sununu) (“The last 
thing someone struggling to stay in their home needs is a huge tax obligation on income that 
they never saw.”).  
14 See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2010) (“Gross income does not include any amount 
which . . . would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in 
part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if . . . (B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is 
insolvent . . . .”); See also McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 454-55 (“Section 
108(a)(1)(B) excludes cancellation of debt income realized while the debtor is insolvent, as 
defined by section 108(d)(3) . . . .  Insolvency is defined in section 108(d)(3) as the excess 
of the taxpayer’s liabilities over the fair market value of the taxpayer’s assets.”); 26 U.S.C. § 
108(a)(1)(a) (2010) (“Gross income does not include any amount which . . . would be 
includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness 
of the taxpayer if . . . (A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case . . . . “); McMahon & 
Simmons, supra note 1, at 460 (“An interesting--and for the taxpayer, unpleasant--result 
occurs when the section 108(a)(1)(A) bankruptcy exception applies and a mortgage lien 
survives the bankruptcy. When personal liability on the debt is discharged but the lien 
survives, the debt is transformed into a nonrecourse debt. When the property is sold or 
foreclosed upon, the amount of any remaining nonrecourse debt encumbering the property is 
included in the amount realized by the taxpayer along with any cash received.”); Monica D. 
Armstrong, From the Great Depression to the Current Housing Crisis:  What Code Section 
108 Tells Us About Congress’ Response to Economic Crisis, 26 AKRON TAX J. 69, 72-84 
(2011); But see Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study Of Consumers’ Post-Discharge 
Finances: Struggle, Stasis, Or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 294 (2008) 
(data reflects Chapter 11 is rarely used in personal bankruptcy cases); Bankruptcy in the 
United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bankruptcy_in_the_United_States (last visited 
February 12, 2011) (“Chapter 11 filings by individuals are allowed, but are rare.”).      
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I. FORGIVEN DEBT IS AN ACCESSION TO WEALTH, AND 
THEREFORE CREATES TAXABLE INCOME 
My former tax law professor said that revenue from any source is 
income unless the tax code says otherwise. His postulate holds true to 
what the Internal Revenue Code actually states, “Except as otherwise 
provided, gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived . . . .”15 
Loan proceeds are not customarily taxed due to the repayment 
obligation of the borrower to repay the loan proceeds.16 However, when 
a loan is forgiven, it is customarily treated as income of the borrower 
under the Internal Revenue Code.17 This logical rule exists because a 
loan which is unpaid effectively places income in the pocket of the 
borrower, even if the borrower speculates with, and loses, the money. 
Concurrently, the lender for an unpaid load is provided with a deduction 
against income for the loss associated with the unpaid loan, thereby 
balancing out the taxation of the transaction.18 
If the loan transaction is viewed as a whole, when a borrower 
receives money in a loan transaction and is later discharged from the 
liability without repaying the debt, the borrower has realized an 
accession to wealth. Recognizing the existence of income in this 
situation generally is not a problem for the income tax system. The 
receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not income because the receipt is 
 
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, 
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) 
the following items . . . (12) Income from discharge of indebtedness . . . .”).    
16 See supra note 1. 
17 See supra note 2; See also Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 1 (holding that taxpayer 
corporation had issued bonds and subsequently repurchased the bonds for less than face 
value. U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this generated income: “[T]he taxpayer made a clear 
gain.  As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 [of] assets previously offset 
by the obligation of bonds now extinct . . . The [taxpayer] has realized within the year an 
accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be 
taken here.”); Id. at 3.; See generally Fred T. Witt, Jr. & William H. Lyons, An Examination 
of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1990) 
(providing an historic analysis of the topic);  McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1 
(providing an extensive analysis of cancellation of debt as income, including the recent 
home mortgage exception). 
18 See 26 U.S.C. § 166 (2010); See also TOPIC 453 BAD DEBT DEDUCTION, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc453.html; McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 416 
(“Every loan charge-off and mortgage foreclosure has tax consequences. While the creditor 
most often claims a bad-debt deduction or business-related loss, the debtor generally must 
recognize gross income and pay income taxes on an amount roughly equal to the creditor’s 
loss, unless a special exception applies to exclude the debt relief from income.”).   
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offset by an obligation to repay the borrowed amount. If the 
obligation to repay the borrowed amount is eliminated or reduced 
without the concomitant repayment, the borrower realizes an 
accession to wealth that, as a matter of tax theory, should be included 
in gross income.19 
An unpaid and forgiven loan is attributed as income of the 
borrower, regardless of whether the borrower used the money to buy 
stock which declined in value, bought black tar heroin which turned out 
to be counterfeit, or, without MoFoDRA, speculated in residential real 
estate.20 
Forgiven mortgage debt is akin to untaxed wage income.21 The 
recipient of a mortgage loan receives the benefit as well as constructive 
custody and control of loan proceeds which are used to speculate on 
residential real estate. Instead of repaying the debt, which is the 
cornerstone of income exclusion,22 the borrower never repays the debt. 
The borrower receives the benefit of the proceeds by gaining ownership 
of the home, subject to the collateral interest secured by a deed of trust, 
 
19 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 415. 
20 See generally McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 426 (“In theory, realization of 
cancellation of debt income does not depend on the nature of the debt.”) and Zelenak, supra 
note 2, at 285 (“Borrowed funds are excluded from income in the first instance because the 
taxpayer’s obligation to repay the funds offsets any increase in the taxpayer’s assets; if the 
taxpayer is thereafter released from his obligation to repay, the taxpayer enjoys a net 
increase in assets equal to the forgiven portion of the debt, and the basis for the original 
exclusion thus evaporates.”)   But see Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), 
rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989) (Tax Court ruled that forgiven gambling debt was taxable 
income, but Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the forgiven debt was not taxable 
because the amount owed was not “indebtedness” within the ambit of Internal Revenue 
Code 108(d)(1) and also that Zarin disputed the validity of the debt, even though the value 
of the underlying gambling chips and extension of credit was undisputed).  See also, 
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 319-325 (discussion of Zarin case and comment that the Zarin 
majority opinion is technically indefensible and widely criticized). 
21 See Rachel Carlton, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 601, 610 (2008) (“For instance, if, upon property acquisition, a $500,000 mortgage is 
secured by a home worth $500,000, the homeowner’s net worth is unchanged. If the lender 
later extinguishes a portion of the homeowner’s mortgage debt, the liability decreases and a 
corresponding increase in net worth results. Continuing with the example, if the lender 
decreases the mortgage debt owed to $400,000, the homeowner’s net worth increases to 
$100,000. From a tax law perspective, the homeowner has realized a gain; and according to 
generally accepted tax theory this gain should be taxable as income.”). See generally supra 
notes 1-2 (discussing that unlike other types of forgiven debt which is treated as taxable 
income, under MoFoDRA the borrower derives an immediate direct economic benefit of the 
loan proceeds extended to him/her coupled with no tax on the unpaid debt). 
22 See generally supra notes 1-2 (discussing that receipt of loan proceeds is not income 
because it is offset with the obligation to repay the borrowed amount). 
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mortgage, or similar instrument.23 
Members of Congress who oppose taxation of income from 
forgiven mortgage loans like to use the mantra “phantom income.”24 
There is nothing phantom about the income. The recipient of the loan 
received the benefit of those funds, used those funds for a purpose 
which he or she selected (i.e. to buy residential real estate), and did not 
repay those funds. 
Senators and Representatives are concerned that without the new 
exemption [of income under MoFoDRA], taxpayers will pay taxes 
on phantom income. But it is not phantom income. If a taxpayer has 
a mortgage of $1000 per month and the house is foreclosed on 
because he or she cannot afford the $1000 per month payment, the 
taxpayer may move into an apartment and pay $500 per month.  That 
is $500 less per month than what the taxpayer owed on the mortgage, 
which is $500 more the taxpayer can keep or spend on other things. 
Moreover, it has long been the policy of the tax code that where a 
taxpayer’s assets are freed from the obligation to secure a debt, the 
taxpayer has incurred taxable income.25 
MoFoDRA provides an incentive to those real estate speculators 
who are solvent, but who elect to strategically walk away from a home. 
“In short, the financial costs of foreclosure, while not insignificant, are 
minimal compared to the financial benefit of strategic default, 
particularly for seriously underwater homeowners. For many, default is 
the ‘in-the-money’ option by any objective measure.”26 
 
23 See generally TED H. GORDON, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW 267 (6th ed. 2006) 
(explaining that title in a mortgage remains with the person who is borrowing money to 
purchase the home, and is a contract by which the property is pledged without delivery for 
repayment of the underlying loan); Fannie Mae, Form 3005, UNIFORM SECURITY 
INSTRUMENT: California Deed of Trust §§ 18 and 23, available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html#highlights (deed of trust as collateral 
security with transfer rights in the borrower); Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, 
Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2010) (“At closing the homeowner signs a promissory note on behalf 
of the originating lender and a mortgage or deed of trust with the originator as the 
mortgagee or the trust beneficiary.”) 
24 See Carlton, supra note 21, at 609; See also Rue Toland, No Tax for “Phantom 
Income:”  How Congress Failed To Encourage Responsible Housing Consumption With Its 
Recent Tax Legislation, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 352-53 (2010). 
25 Curt Hochbein, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 
889, 917-18 (2010). 
26 Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and The Social 
Management Of The Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 986 (2010). 
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II. THE SO CALLED “MORTGAGE MELTDOWN” AND 
EXCLUSION OF FORGIVEN DEBT AS INCOME FROM 2007 
THROUGH 2012 
As of the end of the second quarter of 2011, there was 
approximately thirteen and a half trillion dollars of mortgage debt 
outstanding in the U.S.27 Within this pool of mortgage debtors, 
. . . it has been credibly estimated that there are at least 11.3 million 
U.S. homeowners, and probably as many as 15.2 million or more, 
who are ‘underwater’ in that the outstanding balances on their 
mortgages exceed the market value of their homes . . . . These two 
estimates constitute 23% and 32.2%, respectively, of all mortgaged 
residential properties, and some informed observers expect this 
percentage to sharply increase to as high as 48% by 2011 if property 
values continue to decline in some areas of the country.28 
Congress is responsible for the residential real estate bubble due to 
its 1997 legislation granting tax free treatment for profits in residential 
real estate.29 Not only is Congress to blame for the bubble, but is also 
now to blame for solvent individuals walking away from ill conceived 
acquisitions of residential real estate, thereby driving down prices for 
those who hold on to their homes and pay their debts.30 
MoFoDRA is proof that residential real estate is Congress’ favorite 
child, and why shouldn’t it be?  A mantra calling for every citizen to 
 
27 FED. RESERVE STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL DATA, MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING 
(2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/ 
mortoutstand/current.htm. 
28 Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners: 
Avoiding A New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan 
Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153, 155  (2011). 
29 See generally Toland, supra note 24 (examining various recent tax laws, including 
MoFoDRA, and positing that Congress has failed to address the problems which caused, 
and continue to fuel, the residential housing bubble); Bradford P. Anderson, Welcome to My 
Flipperhood: A Call to Repair the Residential Real Estate Tax Swindle, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 415, 417 (2009) (detailing how the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act changed the tax code to 
allow the sale of a primary residence for up to half a million dollars of tax-free federal 
income, with only a two year ownership and occupancy requirement. This tax preference 
fanned the flames of speculation and irrational exuberance in the residential housing sector 
and also set the stage for a far reaching overall financial meltdown. Financial markets have 
succumbed to the artifice of tax-free incentives targeted at residential real estate, with 
devastating results); 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2010); Chang Cho, Business Property Sales Under 
Secs. 1031 and 121, TAX ADVISER, Apr. 1, 2000, at 223 (“Under Sec. 121(b)(2), for the sale 
of a principal residence on or after May 7, 1997, married couples filing jointly may exclude 
up to $500,000 of gain ($250,000 for singles) . . . .”). 
30  See supra note 11. 
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own his or her own home is politically popular,31 but perhaps the plea 
should only apply to every fiscally responsible citizen.Legislation is 
influenced by money, and there was big money from the residential real 
estate sector and financial loan sector pumped in to Congress in order to 
support passage of MoFoDRA.32 
No other type of forgiven debt, whether credit card, auto loan, or 
otherwise,33 benefits from the singular preferential treatment that 
Congress has conferred upon residential real estate. Those who roll the 
dice on residential real estate get to walk away from their debts on a tax 
free basis under MoFoDRA. The message from Congress is to act 
irresponsibly, and hope that many others do the same, because then you 
will receive preferential treatment. 
Congress adopted the position that MoFoDRA is justified due to 
the fortuity of circumstances and market conditions out of the 
taxpayer’s control.34 If Congress is so in tune with market conditions 
outside of one’s control, then why was there no tax relief for stock 
market investors during the “dot com” decline?35 Congress failed to 
 
31 See generally President George W. Bush, Remark at the Signing of H.R. 3648, The 
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file with White House 
Office of Press Sec’y) (“We want people to have a place they can call their own. After all, 
it’s an essential part of the American Dream. And we want that dream to extend throughout 
our nation. - President George W. Bush”). 
32 See generally MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr-
3648/323588/total-contributions (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (Maplight.org report on 
contributions to members of the U.S. Senate for passage of MoFoDRA showing a total of 
$15,411,298 paid in contributions to U.S. Senators for passage of this bill, of which 
$15,068,073 originated from real estate agents, finance, insurance & real estate interests, 
and mortgage bankers and brokers); MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr-
3648/376414/total-contributions (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (Maplight.org report on 
contributions to members of the U.S. House of Representatives for passage of MoFoDRA 
showing a total of $11,691,876 paid in contributions to members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives for this bill, of which $11,050,276 originated from real estate agents, 
finance, insurance & real estate interests, and mortgage bankers and brokers) Additional 
sums were also contributed for the extension of MoFoDRA, through the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. See MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-
congress/bill/110-hr-1424/352600/contributions-by-vote; MAPLIGHT, 
http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/110-hr-1424/352600/total-contributions (discussing 
extensive lobbying payments by security brokers, investment companies, commercial banks, 
and finance companies). 
33 But cf. Mark J. Marroni, Zarin v. Commissioner: Does a Gambler Have Income From 
the Cancellation of a Casino Debt?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 993, 994-1000 (1993) (explaining 
that in this particular case, the gambler’s debt owed to the casino was not enforceable as a 
matter of New Jersey law, and therefore there was no discharge of indebtedness). 
34 See generally Carlton, supra note 21, at 611-13.  
35 See generally Wayne A. Smith, Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Options in High-
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come to the rescue of those suffering massive losses during this market 
decline, and press coverage indicated a less than sympathetic attitude to 
the victims of the decline.36 “Dot com” victims were the sacrificial 
lambs, and residential housing remains the sacred cow. This perverse 
tax treatment is untenable and indefensible. 
Congress’ fueling of residential real estate speculation with up to 
half a million dollars of tax free gain every two years37 coupled with real 
estate agents and mortgage lenders who market residential housing as 
an “investment,” instead of a home in which to live, have thrust the Las 
Vegas mentality of gambling into residential real estate.38 MoFoDRA is 
to intelligent tax legislation what the Titanic was to sink-proof 
shipbuilding. 
 
Tech Industry: When the Market Crashes, Make Sure You’re Not on the Corner of Easy 
Street and Alternative Minimum Tax Boulevard, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH 865, 880-885 
(2003) (discussing that alternative minimum tax liability resulted in many individuals 
paying large tax bills but having no actual gain after the high technology market collapse; 
although Congress was aware of this problem, no revisions to alternative minimum tax 
occurred to remedy the harm). 
36 See generally Michelle Quinn & Kamika Dunlap, Silicon Valley Slide; The Heart of 
the Tech Boom Has Seen a Lot of Businesses and its Extravagant Lifestyle Go Bust, But 
Some Optimism Remains, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 20, 2002, at 1E (“When the 
mighty fall, as Silicon Valley has done, it’s natural for others to take pleasure from it. 
‘There’s a sense that people think, “You guys got what you deserved,’” said Michael 
Perkins, author of ‘The Internet Bubble.’”); The Dot Com Debacle, NEW YORK OBSERVER, 
Mar. 12, 2001, at 4 (“The downfall of the dot-coms may be a good thing for the long-term 
health of the city, as we witness a return to the values of work and patience, and as young 
professionals realize there is virtue in holding a job instead of hopping from one so-called 
“opportunity” to another. After all, earning a salary, rather than depending on options and 
playing the markets, is where the smart money always places it bets in the end.”); When Dot 
Coms Ruled, Nov. 13, 2000, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (“Many of these businesses deserved to 
die.”). 
37  See supra note 29. 
38 See generally Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits 
of Homeownership Defensible, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 157-158 (2005) (“If owning a home 
is the American dream, then owning a home might also be described as a tax dream ....”); 
Keep the Tax Man Away from Real-Estate Gains, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 2002, 
available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20021122115127/http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/mort
gages/20021120-smartmoney.html. (“If you’ve owned your home and have lived in it for 
two of the previous five years, then you can make a profit of up to $250,000 if you’re single 
or $500,000 if you’re married, with no tax bill. You may however owe state taxes. Never the 
less, this deal is so good that you should do everything you possibly can to get it.”). 
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III. THE INJUSTICE OF NOT TAXING FORGIVEN DEBT.  
 “Justice isn’t blind; it just looks the other way.”39 
A. Equity and Consistency: Things that are alike should be 
treated similarly. 
“Adam Smith’s first canon of taxation was that taxes should be 
equal or equitable. . . .  Aristotle, John Locke, and Adam Smith 
provided the philosophical foundation for a requirement of equality in 
taxation.”40 MoFoDRA in every respect is contrary to these great minds, 
and Congress now supports inequality and inequity as a standard 
baseline. 
Under John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, MoFoDRA violates his two 
principles of justice in that the current law does not guarantee an equal 
claim to basic rights, and there is no equality of opportunity.41“The 
original purpose of equality in taxation was to prevent both privilege 
and oppression. In ancient regimes, some were able to receive 
exemptions from taxation while others without influence paid the bulk 
of the taxes.”42 The current exclusion of taxation on forgiven residential 
mortgage debt favors the wealthy and those who engaged in high stakes 
speculation because our progressive tax scheme affords those 
individuals the greatest tax exemption benefit.43 A wealthy individual 
 
39 THE BOOMTOWN RATS, The Elephants Graveyard, on MONDO BONGO (CBS Records 
1981). 
40 William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional Requirements in 
Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. 1, 8 (2006). 
41 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, And A Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 607, 623-24 (1996);   
see also, Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal 
Property Rights, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1331, 1346 (1996) (“John Rawls - probably the most 
influential liberal theorist of our time - draws on Kant to argue that justice should be 
understood as fairness.”). 
42 Barker, supra note 40, at 13. 
43 See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Guide 2010 for Individuals 17, at 137-201 (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf; Andres Martinez, It’s Your Housing 
Bubble And I’m Paying For It, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 2005, at C-2 (“All 
deductions are regressive by nature because they are worth more to taxpayers with higher 
incomes. The Treasury will give you a $1,500 break for every $10,000 in mortgage interest 
you pay if you are in the 15 percent tax bracket, but you’ll get a $2,800 break on the same 
deal if you are wealthier and paying a 28 percent marginal tax on your income. Isn’t this 
backward?  The deduction is a massive handout to the real estate industry, and a federal 
subsidy to the lifestyles of the nation’s richest households.”); see also Anthony C. Infanti, 
Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2008) (Tax equity is concerned with the fair 
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receives a greater tax benefit from untaxed forgiven mortgage debt, not 
just in real dollars, but proportionately than a lower income individual. 
Currently in America there is widespread concern that the middle 
class is shrinking.  It is becoming more difficult for many in the 
middle class to maintain their position, and the upper classes are 
expanding, thus creating a wider gap between the ‘haves and the 
have-nots’ . . . [with] the potential of negatively affecting the 
economy and creating political instability.44 
As an example of MoFoDRA’s regressive impact, assume that 
William is single with an annual adjusted gross income of $200,000. 
William is in a 33% federal marginal income tax bracket,45 paying 
thirty-three cents in federal tax for every dollar of income at this level.  
When William walks away from his expensive home and receives 
another $300,000 in untaxed forgiven debt, his highest marginal benefit 
increases up to 35% of the forgiven debt.46 Meanwhile, Susan, a middle 
income single person, has an adjusted gross income of $40,000. She is 
in a 25% federal marginal income tax bracket.47 When Susan’s middle 
class home is foreclosed upon, Susan realizes an additional $30,000 in 
forgiven debt, still within the 25% marginal tax bracket. Susan’s tax 
benefit under MoFoDRA is 25% of the forgiven debt, while wealthy 
William receives a regressive benefit ranging between 33-35% of the 
forgiven debt. This regressive treatment unfairly favors high income 
individuals who gambled on a major scale, providing substantially less 
benefit to lower income individuals. If the goal of Congress was to help 
 
treatment of individuals who have the same or different incomes); Richard H. Thaler, It’s 
Time To Rethink The Charity Deduction, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, Sunday 
Business Section, at 5 (explaining that due to our progressive marginal tax bracket system, 
mortgage deductions and charitable deductions are magnified in favor of the highest income 
individuals).  
44 Susan Pace Hamill, A Moral Perspective On The Role of Education in Sustaining the 
Middle Class, 24 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 309, 309-10 (2010); see also 
Susan Pace Hamill, Ideologies of Entire Systems:  A Moral Perspective on “Big Business” 
Fair Share of America’s Tax Burden, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 857, 869 (2004) (“All 
reasonable tax policy experts conclude that tax structures should not be regressive . . . .”). 
45 Internal Revenue Service, Tax Guide 2010 for Individuals 17, at 267 (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. 
46 Id.  In this example, William has an adjusted gross income of $200,000, plus an 
additional $300,000 of forgiven loan debt which is untaxed under MoFoDRA (totaling 
$500,000 of adjusted gross income).  William’s marginal rate is 33% on the adjusted gross 
income up to $373,650, accounting for his $200,000 of income plus $173,650 of forgiven 
loan debt, with the remainder of the forgiven loan debt ($126,350) benefitting William in 
the 35% marginal tax bracket.   
47 Id. 
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the downtrodden, then why not place some reasonable middle class 
income caps on the tax exclusion rather than the upper class caps? 
Additionally, states with legislation which conforms to MoFoDRA 
confer further tax benefits upon those who are solvent and walk away 
from mortgage debt.48 
In addition to the vertical equity49 problem described above, 
MoFoDRA violates horizontal equity by treating persons at the same 
income level and in the same circumstances differently, purely on the 
fortuity of whether the debt was, or will be, forgiven between 2007 and 
2012. “Horizontal equity reflects the notion that similarly situated 
taxpayers should carry the same burden.”50 Under MoFoDRA, two 
people with the same identical income level and circumstances are 
treated differently. Person A is taxed for forgiven mortgage debt if it 
occurs prior to 2007, or after 2012. Meanwhile, person B receives the 
exact same discharged debt and resultant income in 2007 through 2012, 
and person B is not taxed. 
The formal concept of HE [horizontal equity] has its roots in the 
literature of public finance economics. Indeed, some trace the notion 
of HE as a fundamental tax principle to John Stuart Mill, who opined 
that a tax system ought to demand an equal tax burden from 
taxpayers with equal capacity to contribute. Twentieth century 
economists fleshed out that idea further, and Richard Musgrave gave 
 
48 See DeLoitte MultiState Tax, External Update, California Updates Federal Tax 
Conformity to January 1, 2009 (Apr. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_multistate_CA_4-16-2010.pdf. See 
generally CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17144.5; California Tax Conformity Bill, 2010 Cal. 





(conforming partially to federal law, but with a lower exclusion of income than under 
MoFoDRA). 
49 See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian 
Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) [hereinafter Hamill Alabama] (“Vertical equity, which 
primarily focuses on the taxpayer’s ability to pay the tax, seeks to define how to fairly 
apportion the tax burden among taxpayers with different levels of income and wealth. 
Progressive taxes significantly factor in ability to pay by requiring taxpayers with a greater 
ability to pay to bear a higher burden, while regressive taxes disregard ability to pay by 
imposing a heavier burden on taxpayers with less ability to pay.”). 
50 Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 422 (2004). 
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the idea its current name.51 
MoFoDRA also confuses those with rational minds who thrive 
upon consistency because the legislation imposes inconsistent 
treatment.52 For example, you go to a restaurant and order a glass of iced 
tea from your server. Your server brings you iced tea. When you ask for 
a refill of iced tea, you next receive lemonade, and then vodka, and then 
finally spicy salsa in your glass. You would be understandably puzzled, 
having no idea of what might occur next. Indeed, you would find meal 
planning difficult, never knowing what to expect next. MoFoDRA’s 
bizarre tax free zone, coupled with a reinstatement of taxation on 
forgiven home loans in 2013, puzzles the mind of a rational human and 
begs for an explanation of where the consistency lies. 
MoFoDRA’s selective and preferential treatment of residential real 
estate speculators runs counter to the moral evaluation of tax policy 
proposed by tax scholar Susan Pace Hamill, who posits that a moral 
evaluation of tax policy is essential to determine sound tax policy.53  She 
believes that a moral evaluation of tax policy is essential to 
determine sound tax policy.  Hamill argues that a moral evaluation of 
tax policy is the only valid metric that can be used to choose among 
competing tax regimes because the economic models that have been 
used to evaluate tax policy are fatally flawed through their use of 
limited variables . . . .  Hamill argues that Judeo-Christian ethical 
 
51 Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2008). 
52 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377, 388 (1999) 
(“[P]rescriptive equality thus exerts its force by urging decisionmakers [sic] to seek greater 
certainty before deciding what treatment people deserve and before treating them unequally 
in the name of dispensing justice.”).    
53 Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation Of Federal Tax Policy Based On Judeo-Christian 
Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 673-675 (2006) [hereinafter Hamill Virginia].  See also, 
Hamill Alabama, supra note 49, at 3-4 (“This Article applies the moral principles of Judeo-
Christian ethics as a basis for urging the citizens of Alabama to insist that Alabama’s elected 
political leaders reform Alabama’s state tax structure, a critically important step towards 
ensuring that Alabama’s children, especially children from low-income families, enjoy an 
opportunity to build a positive future. Although using these principles as a reason to support 
tax reform may seem unusual, principles of Judeo-Christian ethics offer moral arguments 
that complement and often strengthen secularly based ethical arguments illustrating the need 
for social reform. Throughout American history, the moral principles of Judeo-Christian 
ethics have been used as one of many effective tools to evaluate and reform a wide variety 
of social structures, and have continued to be invoked in political debates. Moreover, when 
distinguishing ethical from unethical tax structures, Judeo-Christian ethics use broad 
principles similar to traditional tax policy theory, both indicating that tax burdens should be 
apportioned according to some measure of the taxpayer’s ability to pay and should raise 
adequate revenues to meet at least the minimum needs of the community subject to the 
tax.”)   
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principles “require tax policy structures that both raise adequate 
revenues providing all citizens a reasonable opportunity to reach 
their potential, and allocate the burden for paying the taxes under a 
moderately progressive model.” 
. . . .  Hamill concludes that a valid Judeo-Christian tax policy must 
strike a balance between respecting individual property rights and 
providing everyone with a chance to realize their potential.54 
Rather than individual accountability and societal participation, 
MoFoDRA represents the pinnacle of individual favoritism. MoFoDRA 
excludes equal treatment of all others who have carried the burden of 
taxes on discharged mortgage debt outside of the “no-tax” window from 
2007-2012. “Objectivist ethics views human beings as independent 
agents and deems each person acting in his or her own long-term 
rational self-interest as the only avenue to reach moral correctness . . . 
[I]ndividual autonomy and the right of each person to be able to 
personally benefit from their efforts in the free market are valued above 
all other considerations . . . .”55 
The real threat of the objectivist ethics model represented by 
MoFoDRA is the self-centered preferential treatment coupled with the 
lack of accountability and elimination of social responsibility for the 
behavior of the individual. That is, those who overextended themselves 
are viewed as victims of circumstance and receive tax free income, 
while those who did not overextend themselves receive no such benefit 
and carry the entire burden of residential real estate speculation. 
Objectivist ethics represents a form of atheism because the human 
person is substituted for a supreme deity. Within the framework of 
objectivist ethics, individuals owe no moral obligations to endure 
greater sacrifices for anyone else’s benefit because only each 
individual’s own self-interest has any moral relevance. Human 
beings acting in their long-term self-interest are considered the sole 
source of all wealth, and through the strength of their own rationality 
are viewed as capable of acting morally . . . .56 
Those who overextended themselves and speculated on residential 
real estate are being rewarded by Congress for their imprudence, which 
 
54 W. Edward Afield, Dining with Tax Collectors: Reducing the Tax Gap Through 
Church-Government Partnerships, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L. J. 53, 107-108 (2010). 
55 Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 739-40. See also, Halewood, supra note 39, at 
1387 (“The progression from Kantian abstract universalism to communicative ethics is a 
progression from an objectivist ethics and epistemology to an intersubjective model.”).  
56 Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 743-44 (internal citations omitted). 
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is simply unfair. “To Aristotle, equality was the measure of justice; the 
unjust is unequal, the just is equal.”57 In Aristotelian theory, “things that 
are alike should be treated alike . . . “58 That being the case, either all 
forgiven debt should not be taxed, whether residential mortgage debt or 
otherwise, or all forgiven debt should be taxed as income because it 
represents an accession to wealth. “Equality is all about determining 
who equals are.”59 Forgiven residential mortgage debt is a superior 
among equals. 
B. A Superior Among Equals: Disparate Treatment is not an 
Unfamiliar Face in Tax Law. 
“The idea of equality may be particularly problematic as a restraint 
on governments’ power to tax.”60 From a constitutional perspective of 
equality, proportional taxation or a fair distribution of taxes would 
require, at a minimum, that the identical same source of income, for 
example, forgiven mortgage debt, should be taxed.61 
Taking consistency and equality to its natural and necessary result, 
one could argue that the disparate treatment of forgiven mortgage debt 
constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although at first 
blush this may be attractive, “[t]he history of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence shows a move from an individual, rights-based concept of 
equality to a regime that appears to have no real concept of equality in 
 
57 Barker, supra note 40, at 5. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 36; see also id. at 48 (“The three faces of equality have been described as 
classical, social, and popular. Classical equality is an individual, rights-based principle that 
limits government action that aims oppressive measures at certain taxpayers while giving 
unwarranted privileges to others . . . . Social equality is a communal, group-based principle 
that relies on a constitutional vision of a more equal society premised on a fairer distribution 
of resources . . . Popular equality is popularly constituted equality. Its content is a matter of 
current political choice.”). 
60 Id. at 2. 
61 KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-31 (mentioning that there exists another problem 
of inequality in the tax treatment of discharged or excused non-recourse mortgage debt.  A 
non-recourse loan is a situation where the lender looks only to the collateral (home) for 
recovery, and not any other assets of the borrower. . . “[T]here will never be COD 
[cancellation of debt] income in the foreclosure of a property with nonrecourse debt.”); see 
also, McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 426-27 (noting that a borrower who retains 
ownership of the property will realize cancellation of debt income, but that if “property 
subject to a nonrecourse debt is deeded to the lender in lieu of foreclosure, the entire amount 
of the nonrecourse debt is included in the amount realized on the sale of the property, even 
if the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property at the time of transfer.”); Frederick 
H. Robinson, Nonrecourse Indebtedness, 11 VA. TAX REV. 1, 37-39 (1991).  
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tax at all . . . leading to almost complete deference to the legislature in 
tax matters.”62 
This deference to the legislative branch in creating tax preferences 
is the foundation of disparate treatment and the resultant lack of equity 
contained in MoFoDRA. 
[M]any incentives clearly have nothing to do with the objective of 
fairness in taxation since their purpose is to treat taxpayers 
differently not on the basis of their particular circumstances, 
including their benefits received or their ability to pay, but instead on 
the basis of public purposes that intentionally distort equality.63 
An Equal Protection argument from one who was taxed on 
forgiven debt prior to MoFoDRA is highly unlikely to meet with 
success. 
Unless the classification infringes a fundamental constitutional right 
(other than the right to equality), Congress is given the widest 
latitude in taxation to make distinctions between taxpayers. A 
legislative enactment represents a legislative determination that the 
classified persons or objects of taxation are, in fact, dissimilar. Such 
a determination cannot be overturned unless the classification does 
not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
There is no requirement that the legislature supply this purpose, and 
the legislation will be sustained as long as the courts find any 
justification. Indeed, the taxpayer must ‘negative every conceivable 
basis which might support’ the legislative classification. Though 
there is a requirement that there be a relation between justification 
and classification, the courts only require a plausible connection, not 
a provable one. In the case of individualized relief provisions for 
special taxpayers, it may be sufficient that Congress concluded that 
these few individuals faced hardship. Whether they did or did not is 
not judicially relevant. Speculation as to whether the classification 
was overinclusive is irrelevant; simply unwise legislation is not 
unconstitutional legislation . . . Though modern taxation often 
creates extreme differences in the taxation of quite economically 
similar taxpayers, these disparities have not been viewed as 
involving the wholesale shifting of the tax burden from one class to 
another.64 
Imagine that you lost your home to foreclosure in December of 
2006. Assume that you had a $250,000 mortgage, and upon foreclosure, 
 
62 Barker, supra note 40, at 4-5. 
63 Id. at 33. 
64 Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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the home sold for $200,000. You would have $50,000 of discharged 
debt that would be fully taxed. Assuming that you are in a 25 percent 
federal marginal tax bracket, this is $12,500 of federal tax that you owe 
for the cancelled residential mortgage debt, plus any state income tax. 
Yet if you had fortuitously defaulted and been foreclosed upon one 
month later, you would have zero tax liability. MoFoDRA is roulette 
wheel tax policy from Congress. 
What if Congress had addressed the right of women to vote in the 
same fashion as MoFoDRA? What if the Nineteenth Amendment,65 
granting women the right to vote, would have only existed for six years, 
with an automatic repeal clause to take effect thereafter? If something is 
wrong, like prohibiting women from voting, it needs to be resolved 
permanently. If taxing forgiven loan debt is wrong, then it should be 
permanently addressed by MoFoDRA. Alternatively, if taxing forgiven 
loan debt is the right thing to do, then we should always do it. 
MoFoDRA’s peculiar six-year preferential treatment of those who are 
solvent, but walk away from imprudent speculation in residential real 
estate, is a bizarre state of affairs.  Even the prohibition of alcohol66 did 
not contain an automatic expiration. When Congress subsequently 
decided that it was bad policy, the prohibition was repealed.67 With 
MoFoDRA, Congress has adopted the following rationale: Good idea to 
tax forgiven mortgage debt prior to 2007; bad idea to tax from 2007 









65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
68 See supra note 4 (MoFoDRA, as enacted and codified, took effect with the 2007 tax 
year, and by virtue of the text of the statute, terminates if the debt is discharged before 
January 1, 2013, i.e. by the conclusion of the tax year 2012). 
Anderson Formatted.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/2011  3:33 PM 
22 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 36:1 
C. Shoddy Tax Policy: Rewarding Bad Conduct and Fiscal 
Irresponsibility. 
“The world owes me a living . . . I’m gonna take your money; 
count your loss when I’m gone. I’m alright Jack; I’m lookin’ after 
number one.”69 
 
With human activity influenced by the tax code, Congress has 
reinforced speculation in residential real estate through MoFoDRA. 
“[T]he power to tax may well be the most important of all governmental 
powers; not only does tax revenue make all other powers practically 
possible, but tax in itself has enormous capacity to mold human 
activity.”70 
In a period of an increasing government deficit,71 MoFoDRA’s tax 
exemption imposes the cost of real estate speculation on innocent 
bystanders. As I describe in this Article, MoFoDRA has transferred the 
externalities and opportunity cost of speculating in residential real 
estate72 from those who overextended themselves and/or engaged in 
imprudent speculation onto the shoulders of those individuals who pay 
their debts, pay tax on their income, and act in a fiscally responsible 
manner. 
A tax system, unlike a theory of the universe, must not only be 
 
69 THE BOOMTOWN RATS, Lookin’ After One, on THE BOOMTOWN RATS (CBS Records 
1977). 
70 Barker, supra note 40, at 1. 
71 See generally Howard Schneider, U.S. Must Reduce Deficit, IMF Warns, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 28, 2011, at A16 (“The IMF warning comes as federal officials grapple with a 
congressional projection this week that the annual deficit will reach a historic $1.5 trillion 
this year. This was the latest report to raise concerns about how massive government debts 
in developed countries could undermine the global economic recovery.”); U.S. Deficit to Hit 
Record $1.5 Trillion, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at 22 (“A continuing weak 
economy and last month’s bipartisan tax cut legislation will drive the government’s deficit 
to a record $1.5 trillion this year, a new government estimate predicts. The eye-popping 
numbers mean the government will continue to borrow 40 cents for every dollar it 
spends.”); Seth McLaughlin, Deficit Diggers Now Vow to Fill Hole; Both Parties Bear Debt 
Blame, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at 1 (“During Mr. Bush’s eight years in office, the 
national debt jumped from $5.628 billion to $9.98 trillion. Mr. Obama’s $814 billion 
stimulus package and unchecked entitlement spending over the past two years pushed the 
total debt past $14 trillion.”). 
72 See Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and 
the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 374 (1998) (“The principal themes 
of tax scholarship – fairness, efficiency, and the search for a comprehensive tax base – are 
essentially economic in nature, so that even “traditional” tax scholarship has something of a 
law-and-economics flavor.”). 
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simple, it must also be ‘fair.’ At a minimum, it must be perceived as 
fair by the taxpaying public in order to withstand the public’s 
scrutiny . . . Fairness is indispensable to enacting tax legislation 
because it increases taxpayer morale and enhances voluntary 
compliance.73 
The only moral compass guiding the exemption of discharged 
mortgage debt from taxation is the self-interest of the ranks of those 
who engage in or benefit from residential real estate speculation, 
including real estate brokers and agents, mortgage lenders, and 
speculators. “Income tax law is utilized to encourage or reward 
activities considered to be beneficial from society’s perspective . . . .”74 
Those who lost homes and were taxed on forgiven debt prior to 2007 
simply did not fail in large enough numbers or lobby strong enough to 
receive this tax preference. What does this say about Congress and the 
current tax preference in MoFoDRA? “[G]reed drives the . . . powerful 
to do everything they can to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.”75 
Residential real estate tax legislation is clearly influenced by the 
powerful real estate lobby.76 
At its core, MoFoDRA creates an incentive for people to 
strategically walk away from homes that they speculated upon by 
providing tax-free treatment for the forgiven loan debt.77 One impact of 
this incentive is to further drive down home prices by increasing the 
supply of homes on the market.78 Although members of Congress may 
argue that MoFoDRA was intended to aid the residential housing 
market, I posit that it has the opposite effect, leading to increased 
defaults on mortgages.79 MoFoDRA also drives down home values, 
creating a long-term punishment and disincentive for those who pay 
 
73 Martinez, supra note 50, at 414-16. 
74 Barker, supra note 40, at 31. 
75 Hamill Virginia, supra note 53, at 763. 
76 See supra note 32. 
77 White, supra note 26, at 985 (“The most significant financial risk from a foreclosure 
is the risk of . . . tax liability for the unsatisfied portion of one’s loan upon foreclosure. But 
even these potential costs are significantly less than one might expect . . . . tax regulations 
have recently changed to waive taxes on the unpaid portion of a mortgage upon foreclosure, 
which was previously classified as income to the borrower if the lender reported it as such.”) 
78 See supra note 11. See generally Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the 
Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 520-530 (2007) (discussing the 
various housing ethics which have shaped U.S. housing law and policy, including housing 
as an economic good, housing as a home, and housing as providing social order). 
79 See supra note 77. 
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their mortgage obligations, by leaving such persons with lower home 
values.80 
“It is no great insight to observe that a tax system can serve several 
different functions. Most obviously, taxes raise revenue for government 
services.”81 In an era of escalating government debt caused by bailouts 
and so-called ‘stimulus’ spending, it seems odd that the federal 
government would elect to reduce its ability to collect taxes by granting 
a tax-free exemption for income derived from discharged residential 
mortgage debt.82 “The IRS estimates that as many as 169,000 returns 
included a form 982 excluding as much as $24.6 billion in cancelled 
debt on 2008 tax returns.”83 
MoFoDRA violates the delicate yin and yang balance of tax policy 
for a loan and its repayment. When a lender loans money to a borrower, 
the borrower receives the benefit of the proceeds but is not subject to 
taxation on the loan proceeds due to the repayment obligation.84 When 
the borrower repays the loan, the loan proceeds return to the lender, 
along with taxable income in the form of the interest paid on the loan.85 
The non-taxation of the borrower, due to repayment, and taxation of the 
lender for interest provides a natural balance.86 When a loan is not 
 
80 See supra note 11. 
81 Galle, supra note 51, at 1346 (“The structure of a tax system can also serve a 
regulatory function, as with the classic Pigouvian tactic of imposing a tax on activities that 
give rise to externalities.”); Id.   
82 See supra note 4. 
83 KREIDER & BROSI, supra note 7, at 3-39. 
84 Allen Holzer, Restructuring the Tax Treatment for Home Equity Draws: 
Implementing Consumption Tax Fundamentals to Preserve Home Equity, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 
225, 232-233 (2010) (“Currently, a mortgagor (a borrower who takes out a home loan) is 
not taxed on proceeds received from a loan. This policy is rooted in the Internal Revenue 
Code’s (“the Code’s”) presumption that a borrower will pay her loan back in full. Therefore, 
the borrower will not receive a net economic gain. . . . In theory, if a borrower pays her loan 
back in full, this tax treatment is logical because she truly does not have a net economic 
gain. However, if the borrower defaults on the loan, she benefits from tax-free gains 
extracted from her property.”)  See also Comm’r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 
U.S. 203, 207-08 (1990) (explaining that a loan is not income due to the repayment 
obligation); Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 
213, 219 (1961). 
85 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(4) (2010). 
86 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 416. (“Every loan charge-off and mortgage 
foreclosure has tax consequences. While the creditor most often claims a bad-debt deduction 
or business-related loss, the debtor generally must recognize gross income and pay income 
taxes on an amount roughly equal to the creditor’s loss, unless a special exception applies to 
exclude the debt relief from income.”).  
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repaid, the lender engaged in the business of making loans reduces his 
or her taxes by taking a deduction for a bad debt, which is offset by the 
borrower being taxed on the unpaid loan proceeds.87 This natural tax 
policy balance is tainted by MoFoDRA, which exempts the borrower 
from taxation on the discharged debt while granting the lender (e.g., 
banks which received bailout money) a tax deduction for the unpaid 
loan.88 Instead of creating a level playing field of asset parity, 
Congress’s exclusion of income from discharged mortgage debt is 
merely putting more fuel on the fire for residential real estate 
speculation. 
D. Even Without MoFoDRA, There Was Already Relief for Those 
Who Were Insolvent. 
MoFoDRA was never needed to protect those who are truly 
underwater. Section 108(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code 
excludes discharge of indebtedness from income if the taxpayer is 
“insolvent.”89 Insolvency is defined in Section 108(d)(3) as “the excess 
of liabilities over the fair market value of assets.”90 Judicial 
interpretation of this provision “requires that all of the taxpayer’s assets, 
including assets exempt from the claims of creditors under state law, be 
included in determining whether the taxpayer’s liabilities exceed his 
assets.”91 
For those who argue that MoFoDRA was necessary to prevent 
harming those who are upside down in their mortgage, the insolvency 
exception already offered protection. MoFoDRA extends tax-free 
treatment to individuals who are solvent and have the capacity to pay 
income tax on discharged mortgage debt. The insolvency exception 
obviates the need for MoFoDRA. Similarly, if MoFoDRA’s income tax 
exclusion rests upon the elusive concern of anticipatory filings for 
bankruptcy, then perhaps all forgiven loan debt, mortgage or otherwise, 
should be excluded from taxation for the fear that the recipients of this 
 
87 26 U.S.C. § 166 (2010). 
88 Id. 
89 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2010). See also Leila E. Dal Pos, Hard Times for 
Individuals: Creditor Issues & Estate Administration, 50 N.H.B.J. 16, 19 (2009) (“[T]he 
term ‘insolvent’ means the excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets, 
determined immediately before the discharge. The amount that may be excluded from 
income is no more than the amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent.”).  
90 26 U.S.C. § 108(d)(3) (2010). 
91 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 1, at 455. 
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income might declare bankruptcy. Barking at shadows does not justify 
poor tax policy. 
If banks and mortgage brokers are the evil causa sine quo non of 
mortgage debt being incurred in the first place, and individuals who 
speculated in residential real estate did so under the duress of nasty 
banks and mortgage brokers, then the victim should pursue civil 
remedies against the transgressors for all damages.92 Civil remedies are 
also appropriate in the event of fraudulent foreclosure mills.93 
MoFoDRA cannot be justified by using a broad brush to paint a picture 
of borrowers being unfairly influenced by real estate agents, banks, and 
mortgage brokers. 
It could be argued that a person who walks away from his or her 
home is already punished by loss of any down payment and principal 
amount paid, or by virtue of a bad credit score. The loss of the down 
payment and any principal payments made are part of home ownership, 
and in any event, would reduce the total amount of discharged debt and 
taxable income, even without MoFoDRA. As to the issue of credit 
scores, “While the actual financial cost of having a poor credit score for 
a few years may be hard to quantify, it is not likely to be significant for 
most individuals - especially not when compared to the savings 
achieved by walking away from a seriously underwater mortgage. 
Whereas a good credit score might save an average person tens of 
thousands of dollars over the course of a lifetime, a few years of poor 
credit shouldn’t cost more than few thousand dollars. “94 
Professor Brent White of the University of Arizona has published 
an intriguing article about the strategic decision on whether to walk 
away from an underwater mortgage.95 His article is well reasoned and 
even handed in its legal, moral, and ethical analysis of the topic. My 
 
92 White, supra note 26, at 993, note 100. 
93 See generally Todd Ruger, Shortcuts On The Paper Trail, SARASOTA HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1 (improper dates and signatures on mortgage documents have 
resulted in inappropriate foreclosures);  Tom Harvey, B of A Focus of Utah Foreclosure 
Lawsuit, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 17, 2011 (no page number listed) (challenges raised 
to foreclosure process); Julie Creswell & Barry Meier, Bet on Foreclosure Boom Turns Sour 
For Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, § B, at 1 (investors in a business specializing in 
foreclosures are concerned over possible inappropriate activity in the foreclosure process);  
John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, § 
A, at 1 (failure to follow appropriate technicalities in foreclosure process raise judicial 
concerns). 
94 White, supra note 26, at 984-85. 
95 Id. 
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thesis in this article does not conflict with Professor White’s analysis, as 
I merely offer up that part of the strategic analysis on whether to walk 
away from a mortgage must include the calculation of taxes due on the 
discharged debt for a solvent individual, because discharged mortgage 
loan debt is a form of income, but for the existence of MoFoDRA. 
VI.  UNFORGIVEN; THE SOLUTION TO INCOME FROM 
DISCHARGED MORTGAGE DEBT 
My first two proffered solutions to the forgiveness of mortgage 
debt conundrum primarily address consistency in application. If taxing 
discharged loan debt is a good thing, then it must always be a good 
thing and always done. If taxing discharged loan debt is a bad thing, 
then it must never be done and reparations must be paid to those who 
were wronged. 
A. The New Law is Good; Pay Reparations for the Past 
If MoFoDRA’s tax exemption for unpaid mortgage debt is such a 
great idea, then it should be extended perpetually and not terminate at 
the end of 2012.96 In such an event, reparations must be paid to all 
persons who have paid income tax in the past on discharged mortgage 
indebtedness. Such reparations obviously must include the principal 
amount paid in taxes plus interest and any penalties paid thereupon. 
Indeed, other commentators have examined the topic of potential 
retroactive application of MoFoDRA: 
“While retroactively applying the Act’s provisions to years prior to 
2007 would necessitate some burden on the IRS in refunding paid taxes, 
it is not clear why the usually applicable rules for amendment should 
not provide an administratively feasible retroactive start date. Apart 
from procedural considerations, there is little plausible substantive 
rationale for the start date, as the mortgage crisis was well underway 
during 2006.”97 
Additionally, if MoFoDRA is good tax policy, then the theme of 
consistency requires that all forgiven debt should not be taxed, whether 
 
96 See supra note 4 (MoFoDRA, as enacted and codified, took effect with the 2007 tax 
year, and by virtue of the text of the statute, terminates if the debt is discharged before 
January 1, 2013, i.e. by the conclusion of the tax year 2012); see also Hamill Virginia, supra 
note 53, at note 138 (explaining that those who embrace supply side economic theory 
believe that cutting taxes will spur economic growth). 
97 See Carlton, supra note 21, at 612. 
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for credit cards, auto loans, gambling, or otherwise. No other type of 
forgiven debt should have to serve as the unappealing (i.e. taxed) step-
brother or step-sister of the favorite child, residential real estate. 
B.  The New Law is Bad; Tax Discharged Mortgage Debt 
Another consistent and equal solution is to determine that forgiven 
mortgage loan debt actually is income and it must be taxed. This would 
require Congress to immediately revoke the current tax exemption 
under MoFoDRA and commence taxing the discharged debt. 
Opponents of this solution might argue that this could accelerate 
foreclosures, as individuals may seek to strategically walk away from 
loans before discharged debt becomes taxed once again. That is a 
possibility, but only one part of the equation on whether to walk away 
from a home.98 Taxing the forgiven debt will only affect solvent 
individuals who walk away from homes. Those who are insolvent and 
receive income in the form of cancelled mortgage debt will continue to 
be protected by the insolvency provision in the Internal Revenue Code.99 
What about those solvent individuals who have already profited by 
not being taxed upon forgiven loan debt? One way to address this 
problem would be to retroactively tax those who walked away.100 The 
difficulty in doing so is that retroactive taxation runs counter to the 
tenets of fairness described earlier. Despite this, it is tempting to collect 
income tax from solvent individuals who were complicit in the housing 
bubble and benefited from untaxed income in the form of forgiven debt. 
C. A Pragmatic Approach: Reward Those Who Pay and Stay 
A third solution to the problem of MoFoDRA recognizes that 
perhaps some form of tax relief is digestible. The Internal Revenue 
 
98 See White, supra note 26. 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 14, 89-91. 
100 See generally Saul Levmore, The Case For Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 265 (1993) (analyzing economic, political, and public policy aspects of retroactive 
taxation, and establishing that retroactive taxation is a potential workable solution, despite 
the general disposition against it); ERIKA K. LUNDER ET AL. CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40466, RETROACTIVE TAXATION OF EXECUTIVE BONUSES: 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF H.R. 1586 AND S. 651 (2009) (discussing the 
constitutionality of retroactive taxation of bonuses). But see Harold M. Somers, Retroactive 
Taxation: A Triumph of Law Over Economics, (Univ. of Cal. L.A. Dep’t of Econ., Working 
Paper No. 726, 1995) (arguing that changing the rules of taxation after economic decisions 
have been made is an abhorrent idea).  
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Code calls for taxation on any significant modification to a loan, such as 
the interest rate or timing of payments,101 and not only discharged 
principal. MoFoDRA could be modified to only exempt taxation for 
individuals who receive a reduced interest rate, a “no interest rate” time 
period or tolling of interest accumulation, or extended payment terms. 
This approach would not allow discharge of any principal amount to be 
exempt from taxation. This significant loan modification exemption 
should only apply if the individual continues to pay the full principal 
amount of the loan. This resolution is a far cry superior to MoFoDRA’s 
current allowance of tax-free income in the form of discharged principal 
debt. 
Some might take this pragmatic solution a step further and support 
forgiveness of taxation on a small principal amount, something 
substantially less than the regressive $2 million exemption under 
MoFoDRA,102 as long as the borrower continues to fully pay the 
remainder of the loan. Arguably, this approach could create an incentive 
for an individual to remain in his or her home and continue performing 
his or her payment obligations, albeit at a reduced principal amount. If 
the income forgiveness is significantly reduced below the current $2 
million potential exemption, and tied to an individual’s adjusted gross 
income in order to better protect low and middle income individuals, 
such a solution could address the vertical equity issues described earlier, 
but would still continue to fail to address the horizontal equity issue of 
those who were burdened with taxation prior to MoFoDRA. From a 
perspective of true equality, implementation of any part of this 
pragmatic solution would require application to all types of debt, and 
not just residential real estate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The sacred cow of residential real estate tax preferences needs to 
be slaughtered, or at least forced to eat in the same pasture as all other 
capital investments. Congress created tax-free residential real estate 
profits through tax code revisions in 1997 which fueled speculation in 
housing. When the music stopped, Congress granted preferential tax 
treatment to persons who defaulted on their mortgage debt, instead of 
rewarding those who honor their mortgage obligations. 
 
101 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra note 6. 
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Given the fact that the Internal Revenue Code already shields 
against taxation on forgiven mortgage debt for those who are insolvent, 
MoFoDRA was entirely unnecessary.  Instead of protecting the 
downtrodden, MoFoDRA grants a regressive preference to solvent and 
wealthy individuals who strategically evade taxation on forgiven 
residential mortgage debt. The cost of this legislation results in reduced 
governmental coffers and tighter mortgage lending practices, squeezing 
innocent newcomers from being able to purchase a home and actually 
pay the loan. 
Tax policy should not result in disparate treatment. Tax legislation 
needs to have a coherent theme, commencing with standards of 
consistency and equality. MoFoDRA ultimately punishes individuals 
who perform their mortgage payment obligations, and rewards solvent 
persons who speculated and strategically default on residential real 
estate loans. 
 
